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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to give some account of the problems
and practices of tax planning in England. It is intended as an
outline only. There is no space for more, and much of the detail
and technicalities will be omitted where they would confuse the
main story. A reader who needs to have further details could find
them by following up the footnote references.'
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ford; S.J.D., 1959, Harvard. Rhodes Scholar, Brasenose, Oxford. Common-
wealth Fund Fellow, Harvard, 1951-52. Univ. of London, King's College,
Faculty of Laws, Strand, London, England. Barrister at Law (Lincoln's
Inn) 1953.
1. The leading works in this field are the following:
a. Books on Estate Duty:
DymoxnD, DEATH DuTIEs (14th ed. 1965 and Supp.); GREEN, DEATH Du-
TIES (7th ed. 1971); BEATr, ELEMNTs or ESTATE DuTy (7th ed. 1970);
HANsON, DEATH DUTIES (10th ed. 1966 and Supp.); LAWTON, A.D.
ESTATE DuTY IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1970).
b. Books on Tax Planning:
POTTER AND MONROE: TAx PLANNING (6th ed. 1970); Moncom, ESTATE
DUTy SAVING AND CAPITAL GAINS TAx (4th ed. 1969 and Supp.); RAY,
PRACTICAL ESTATE PLANNING (1970); HARRIS AND HswsoN, L= AssuR-
ANcE AND TAx PLANNING (1970).
c. Compilations of Statutes:
SWEET & MAXWELL'S GUIDE To THE ESTATE DuTy STATUTES: ed., G.S.A.
Wheatcroft (1960); BUTTERWORTH'S ESTATE DuTY STATUTES (1971); BuT-
TERwoRTH's TAx HANDBooK (1971); DYmoND's DEATH DuTIEs, Vol. II.
d. General.
BRTISH TAx ENCYCLOPAEIA; PINSON, REVENUE LAW (5th ed. 1971); HAN-
BuRY, MODERN EQuITz (9th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as HANBURY].
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No attempt will be made to present this material in the form of a
comparison with California law. California trust and tax lawyers
can easily make their own comparisons. There are clearly many
situations in which a knowledge of both the California and the Eng-
lish law is necessary. There are, however, two points of difference
which it may be useful to indicate at the outset:
A. As will be seen from the figures given below concerning tax
and estate duty rates, the rate of taxation is much higher in England
than it is in any part of the United States. Add to this the de-
pressed economic situation of the last decade in England, and it will
be seen that the problem of acquiring and retaining private capital
is greatly increased. Tax planning therefore becomes a factor of
great importance for those people in England who have any private
capital with which to work.
B. There is no practice in England equivalent to the American
revocable trust, giving the trustor a life interest with remainders
over and a power of revocation. There are no tax or estate duty
advantages in a revocable inter vivos trust (any more than there
are in the United States) and there is, in England, no fear of probate.
So an owner of capital will either make an inter vivos trust for tax
planning reasons or will die with it and create a testamentary trust
by his will.
The problem of management, of course, exists. This solves itself
in the case of many widows, unused to business, because they will
in most cases be income beneficiaries under a trust created under
their husbands' wills. If a person is absolute owner, and not com-
petent to manage his capital, there is sufficient advice available
from financial advisers, stockbrokers and, in the case of large funds,
the Merchant Banks.
II. THE BRITISH FIscAL SYsTEm
To appreciate the way in which estate planning is done in Eng-
land, it is necessary to give a short account of the British tax system.
Of course, this will be general and sketchy and is not an adequate
basis on which to base practical decisions. The three most signifi-
cant fiscal obligations which must be considered are income tax
(and surtax), capital gains tax and estate duty. There is as yet no
gift tax. Corporations are liable to pay corporation tax on all their
income and capital profits at the rate of 40%2, but that is a matter
outside the scope of the present inquiry. For income tax purposes,
the financial year runs from April 6 to April 5.
A. Income Tax. The current system relating to income tax is the
result of piecemeal legislation over many years. As would be ex-
pected, it contains many unnecessary anomalies and complications.
The present Government has announced its intention of making
substantial reforms which are expected to be effective in 1973; and,
as will be seen, some of these provisions are included in the Finance
Act 1971. I will attempt first of all to say something about the situ-
ation as it is at the present time, and then to refer in outline to some
of the reforms which are to be expected.
1. Standard Rate. The British income tax system works upon
the basis of a standard rate which is currently 38.75%,3 having
been reduced from 41.25% as from April 6, 1971, pursuant to elec-
tion promises of the present Government to reduce taxation. These
odd figures arise because the standard rate of income tax was ex-
pressed in money terms and not in percentage terms prior to the
decimilization of the currency in February, 1971 (the figures rep-
resent respectively 7/9d in the £ and 8/3d in the £. There used
to be 12 pennies in a shilling, 20 shillings in a pound; and thus 240
pennies in a £. Since decimilization, there are 100 new pennies in
the £.
2. Allowances. There are, of course, various allowances which
can effectively reduce the rate which an individual has to pay, and
which will bring his effective rate below the standard rate. The
most significant of these allowances are:
4
Personal Reliefs. Single Person. Exempt up to £ 325
Married Person. Exempt up to £ 465
Married Couple. Relief in respect of wife's
earnings: 7/9ths, up to maxi-
mum of £ 325.
Old Age Relief. Single Person. Exempt if under £ 504.
Married Couple. Exempt if under £ 786.
Above these levels, 2/9ths.
Earned Income Relief. 2/9ths up to £ 4005; 15% on excess.
Child Relief. For child under 10 years £ 155.
For child between 11 and 15 years £ 280.
For child of 16 and over £ 205.
Small Income Relief. 2/9ths on income up to £ 450.
Life Assurance Relief. 2/Sths of premium.
2. Finance Act 1971, § 14 [hereinafter cited as F.A.].
3. Income and Corporations Taxes (No. 2) Act 1970, c. 54, § 1.
4. Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 as amended, F.A. 1971, § 15
[hereinafter cited as T.A.].
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There is no opportunity such as there is in the United States to
treat the combined income of husband and wife as if they each
earned half the family income, and to be taxed on that basis.5 In
England, the income of a wife is aggregated with that of her hus-
band, and is treated as his income for tax purposes. This means,
of course, that the higher your earned income, and particularly the
higher your wife's earned income, the more economical it is to live
in sin than to marry. As from the financial year 1972-1973, how-
ever, a husband and wife, living together, may elect that the whole
of the wife's earned income (i.e., not investment income) shall be
assessed separately from the husband's income.6 So you won't
need now to divorce your wife to be well off; just send her to
work.
3. Surtax. An additional tax which is assessed separately from
income tax, and which operates to impose further liability above the
standard rate, is surtax. This is applicable to earned income above
£ 5,500, and to all unearned income where the total income exceeds
£ 2,500.7 Surtax is payable on a sliding scale.8 If translated into
dollars at the rate of 2.4 to the £, it will be seen at what extremely
low levels of income the tax system appears to consider that the
38.75% rate is inadequate.
4. Trust Income. Income of a trust is taxed at the standard rate
of income tax. Any adjustments necessary in respect of payments
to beneficiaries are made in the computation of that beneficiary's
income; thus, the money paid to the beneficiary will already have
borne income tax at the standard rate. If the beneficiary is liable
to surtax, he will be so charged on the basis of his own tax return
which will include a statement of the trust income. If his income is
not sufficient to reach that level at which the standard rate is appli-
cable, he will be able to claim repayments due to him under the vari-
ous allowances to which he is entitled. Credit will be given for tax
paid by foreign trusts under foreign law. It will be clear, however,
that income from a substantial American trust will be likely to suf-
fer considerable further tax in the hands of a British resident bene-
5. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954.
6. F.A. 1971, § 23, sched. 4.
7. F.A. 1971, § 13.
8. Starting at about 10% and reaching 50% on income of about £ 20,000.
This is of course in addition to the income tax. See F.A. 1970, § 12.
ficiary, especially a woman married to a man with an income of his
own-since her share of the trust income will be aggregated.
But there are further difficulties if the beneficiary is an infant.
By legislation, first introduced in 1936, the income of a trust in favor
of a child of the trustor is treated during the unmarried minority
of that child, or until the attainment of the age of 21 by a child of
the trustor who was not regularly working, as the income of the
trustor.9 It should be remembered that infancy now ends in Eng-
land at the age of 18.10 Since April 6, 1969 (and until April, 1972)
the unearned income of an infant, who is unmarried and not regu-
larly working, is to be treated as the income of the parent,11 re-
gardless of who created the settlement. Such liability applies only
where the infant is entitled to, or receives the income; it does not
attach where the income is accumulated-as it may be where the
income arises under a discretionary trust, or where the infant is
contingently entitled, and unapplied income is accumulated for the
benefit of the infant under Trustee Act 1925.12 Generally speak-
ing, therefore, a trustor can obtain no income tax or surtax advan-
tages by setting up a trust under which his own infant children re-
ceive the income. Whether or not a tax advantage arises where
the property is given to or in trust for children of another depends
upon the tax situation of the parents of the infant.
Section 16 of the Finance Act 1971, however, provides relief in
these cases in respect of the financial year 1972-1973 and subsequent
years. Income of a child which arises under a trust created by a
parent is to be treated as that of the parent only until the child at-
tains the age of 18 years. And the income of a child under a trust
which was created by someone other than the parent of the child is
no longer to be treated as that of the parent. The repeal of these
aggregation provisions in relation to trusts not made by parents
will once again enable grandparents (and others) to obtain tax ad-
vantages by setting up trusts for grandchildren (and others) or by
entering into seven year deeds of covenant to pay money to them.
These matters will be further explained in section IV; F.
5. Methods of Collection. Salaries and wages are taxed at source
under what is called the P.A.Y.E. system; that is, the Pay-As-You-
Earn system. Each taxpayer is assigned a code number which takes
into account his personal reliefs and earned income relief. P.A.Y.E.
9. F.A. 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c. 34, § 21, as amended, T.A. 1970,
c. 2, § 437 et seq.
10. Family Law Reform Act 1969, c. 46, § 1.
11. T.A. 1970, c. 2, §§ 43-48, amending F.A. 1968, c. 44, § 15.
12. Trustee Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 9, § 31.
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tables indicate to an employer the deductions which are to be made
from an employees pay. A detailed adjustment is made at the end
of the year, if necessary. Income taxed at the standard rate is also
deducted from dividends before payment and also from nearly all
Government bonds and securities. Earnings of the self-employed,
such as professional fees and casual earnings, are assessed upon
the basis of a declaration made at the end of the year; the tax is
paid in the following tax year.
6. The Reforms Promised in the White Paper. Cmd 4653.13
Part II, Chapter 3 of the Finance Act 1971 contains eight sections
dealing with the charge to income tax for the year 1973-1974 and
subsequent years. The alterations are intended to simplify the
methods of computing and charging tax. They are not intended to
effect changes in the amount of tax paid by individuals.
There is to be a basic rate, set for 1973-1974 at 30%. 14 Higher
rates will be applicable to higher income, and an additional rate will
apply to higher levels of investment income.' 5 In this way the pres-
ent reliefs granted to earned income will disappear,16 as will the
surtax. A list of personal reliefs is given in section 33. There is no
need to give further details at this stage. The alterations were in-
troduced for the purpose of administrative simplicity and ease of
comprehension. They have generally been met with approval, and
success appears likely.
B. Capital Gains Tax. Because of the changes which have been
made in the last ten years, it will be best to explain the legislation
on capital gains tax in three stages. First, the short-term capital
gains tax was introduced in 1962. The Finance Act 1962 provided
that capital gains made within six months of a purchase should be
treated as income."' Second, the Finance Act 1965 continued the
short-term tax, making it applicable to dispositions within twelve
months, and introduced for the first time a long-term capital gains
tax. Long-term gains are chargeable at the rate of 30% on a dis-
posal of assets.' s There are, of course, some exceptions, 9 of which
13. A summary of the White Paper will be found in 1971 NEW L.J. 389.
14. F.A. 1971, § 39.
15. Id., § 32(1).
16. Id., § 32(2).
17. F.A. 1962, 10 & 11, Eliz. 2, c. 44, technically called Case VII of
Schedule D.
18. F.A. 1965, c. 25, § 20(3).
19. Id., § 27.
the most significant is a taxpayer's main or only residence. 20 There
were also provisions, now largely repealed, by which the tax was
payable not only upon an actual disposal, but also upon a "deemed"
or notional disposal. Thus, there was a deemed disposal on death,
21
a deemed disposal of all the property in a trust when the life tenant
died,22 and also a deemed disposal where a person became absolutely
entitled as against the trustees.23 Further, in a trust in which no
person was entitled to the income-as in the standard form of dis-
cretionary trust described below-there was a deemed disposal of
the whole capital assets of the trust every 15 years..2 4 Third, the
Finance Act 1971 has allowed some relaxation of these provisions.
(i) Short term capital gains tax is abolished. 2  Gains are governed
by a single set of rules, regardless of holding period. (ii) Death no
longer constitutes a deemed disposal by the deceased. 26 Therefore
capital gains tax is not charged at death. Gains which accrued dur-
ing the lifetime of the deceased are indeed never taxed, for the per-
sonal representatives of the deceased are deemed to acquire them
at their market value on the date of death.2 7 (iii) There is no
longer a deemed disposal at the conclusion of each fifteen year pe-
riod for a trust which has no life tenant entitled to the income.28
(iv) Relief is given in respect of disposals up to a value of £ 500
in any one tax year.2 9 This was a much needed reform. The cost
of taxing small disposals was out of all proportion to the revenue
produced.
The extreme severity of capital gains tax as it applied before the
passing of the Finance Act 1971 to trusts created by English trustors
could be to some extent alleviated in the case of trusts where the
majority of the trustees were resident and ordinarily resident
abroad, and the general administration of the trust is ordinarily car-
ried on abroad.30 If the beneficiaries are resident or domiciled
abroad, there is then no liability for capital gains tax. If the bene-
ficiaries are domiciled and either resident or ordinarily resident in
the United Kingdom, capital gains tax is payable in respect of gains
attributable to each beneficiary's interest.81 In the case of a discre-
20. Id., § 29.
21. Id., § 24(1).
22. Id., § 25(4).
23. Id., § 25(3).
24. Id., § 25 (7).
25. F.A. 1971, § 56.
26. Id., § 59(1).
27. Id., sched. 12, para. 1.
28. Id., § 59(2).
29. Id., § 57(1).
30. F.A. 1965, c. 25, § 42.
31. Id., § 42(2).
[VOL. 9:264, 1972] Tax Planning in England
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tionary trust, however, where no beneficiary has any "interest,"
capital gains tax is payable upon receipt of income within the last
three years or upon distribution of capital.3 2 Thus, the ordinary
buying and selling of stock by the trustee escapes any liability for
capital gains tax. The transfer or "exporting" of trusts to tax
havens overseas still has many advantages; and, although these are
not so great as they were before the 1971 Act (in view of the aboli-
tion by that Act of the liability to tax upon the death of a life tenant
and after the passage of 15 years), many trustors and beneficiaries
have desired to replace their United Kingdom resident trustees by
other trustees resident abroad or by a trust corporation which is
resident in a tax haven overseas. A very substantial business in ex-
porting trusts to tax havens, particularly the Bahamas, Bermuda
and the Island of Jersey (which is a separate tax jurisdiction from
the United Kingdom), has developed. There has been little litiga-
tion on the tax implications in this area, but doubts have been ex-
pressed as to the propriety of appointing overseas resident trustees
unless the beneficiaries are resident abroad as well.3 3 An English
trust with beneficiaries in England should be administered by trus-
tees who are within the jurisdiction. It is clear that the Court
will refuse to appoint foreign trustees unless it is satisfied that the
beneficiaries intend to reside permanently in that overseas country.3 4
That is not, however, to say that a trustor may not appoint overseas
resident trustees, nor that a person who has the power to appoint
new trustees may not select trustees resident overseas. Turner L.J.
in Re Tempest,35 in discussing the court's power to appoint new
trustees, stated that the court was reluctant to appoint a person
who is a beneficiary, or who is related to a beneficiary, or who is the
solicitor to the trust or to one of the beneficiaries. Further, it has
been said that these principles should guide individuals exercising a
power to appoint new trustees.3 6 In practice, however, it is com-
mon for beneficiaries to be appointed as well as the solicitor to the
32. Id., § 42(3).
33. Re Weston's Settlements [1969] 1 Ch. 223 (C.A. 1968). Other cases
have upheld the appointment because of the connection of the beneficiaries
with the foreign country. See Re Seale's Marriage Settlement [1961] 1
Ch. 574, Re Windeatt's Will Trusts [1969] 1 W.L.R. 692, Re Whiteheads
Will Trusts [1971] 2 All E.R. 1334.
34. Re Weston's Settlements [1969] 1 Ch. 223 (C.A. 1968).
35. [1866] L.R. 1 Ch. 485.
36. SELL, EQurrZ 211 (26th ed. -).
trust. Whether therefore the court would make an appointment, or
whether the court would consider an appointment to be proper, the
court appears reluctant to rectify an existing appointment. Conse-
quently, there seems to be no obstacle to the appointment of a trus-
tee resident overseas, 37 and a large number of trusts have been ex-
ported in this way. But it is common to advise existing trustees
that they may run some risk if they retire in order to facilitate such
an "improper" appointment, since they may well remain liable in re-
spect of breach of trust and in respect of the fiscal liabilities of the
trust.3 8 The law on this matter is still in a stage of development.
C. Estate Duty
1. Passing of Property. First, as a matter of terminology, let it
be said that the word "tax" in England refers to income tax, capital
gains tax and to some others. We do not have or speak of "estate
tax" it is always spoken of as "estate duty." Indeed, one often re-
fers just to "duty", and this means estate duty.
Estate duty is payable "upon the principal value ascertained as
hereinafter provided of all property, real or personal, settled or not
settled, which passes on the death." Such is the provision of Sec-
tion I of the Finance Act of 1894, which is still the basic enactment
dealing with estate duty. The meaning of "passing", as defined in
Section 2, has been amended substantially by the Finance Act
1969.3 9 Property which passes on the death includes not only the
free estate of the deceased, that is to say the property which he owns
himself and may dispose of by will, but includes also the capital
value of any trust property in which the deceased had a limited in-
terest, such as a life interest. Where this is the case, the free es-
tate and the capital of the trust are aggregated together for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the rate of estate duty payable upon each of
these sources. This imposition of duty upon the capital of a trust
where the deceased had only a limited interest, and the principle of
aggregation are the two factors which make the English Estate
Duty system particularly onerous. I will return to this matter in
more detail later on.
2. The Rates of Duty. The rates of duty are laid down in Sched-
ule 17 to the Finance Act 1969 (as amended by the Finance Act
1971, Section 61).40 It will be sufficient for our present purposes
37. Meinertzhagen v. Davis [1844] 1 Col. 353, Re Smith's Trusts [1872]
26 L.T.R. (n.s.) 820, 85 L.Q.R. 15 (1969).
38. F.A. 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 30, § 8 (4).
39. F.A. 1969, c. 32, § 36(2).
40. F.A. 1969, c. 32, sched. 17, part F, as amended, F.A. 1971, § 61.
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to indicate percentages which have to be paid:41
Cumulative
Value of Amount of Estate Estate Rate Marginal Rate
Estate Duty (average) (on excess)
£ £ % %
12,500 nil nil 25
15,000 625 4.167 25
17,500 1,250 7.143 30
20,000 2,000 10 30
22,500 2,750 12.222 30
30,000 5,000 16.667 45
35,000 7,250 20.714 45
40,000 9,500 23.75 60
45,000 12,500 27.778 60
50,000 15,500 31 60
60,000 21,500 35.833 60
65,000 24,500 37.692 60
70,000 27,500 39.286 60
75,000 30,500 40.667 60
80,000 33,500 41.875 65
90,000 40,000 44.444 65
100,000 46,500 46.5 65
125,000 62,750 50.2 65
150,000 79,000 52.667 70
200,000 114,000 57 70
300,000 184,000 61.333 75
400,000 259,000 64.75 75
500,000 334,000 66.8 80
750,000 534,000 71.2 80
900,000 661,500 73.5 85*
*On estates over £2,070,000, tle rate is limited to 80% overall.
3. Property Given Away. There is, as has been pointed out, no
gift tax in England, and it is possible to give away as much prop-
erty as one wishes quite freely; but there is, of course, a liability to
capital gains tax if the property given away is pregnant with gains,
as this constitutes a disposal.42 So far as estate duty is concerned,
property given away will be subject to duty on the death of the
donor unless it was given away at least 7 years prior to the death,
and bona fide possession and enjoyment of the property had been
assumed by the donee to the entire exclusion of the donor.43 The
dutiable value of the property given is, however, reduced if the gift
was made in the fifth, sixth, or seventh year prior to the death.
44
41. Compiled by Mr. R. P. Roly, Solicitor, and published in NEw L.J.,
July 1, 1971.
42. F.A. 1965, c. 32, § 22(4).
43. F.A. 1968, c. 44, § 35.
44. F.A. 1968, c. 44, § 35(2).
4. Limited Interests.
Property Passing. As was mentioned above, the capital of
the trust passes on the death of the owner of a limited interest.
Thus, if the life tenant, entitled to the whole income, dies, there is
a passing of the whole capital value of the fund.45 There is an ex-
ception to this in the case of the surviving spouse.4 0 Where duty
has been paid upon the death of the first spouse to die, then so long
as the second spouse has only a limited interest in the fund, and is
not competent to dispose of the capital, duty is not payable a second
time on the death of the second spouse. If a husband has given his
property to his wife absolutely, duty is payable upon her death as
well. This exception is of course an advantage to the fund gener-
ally and to the remaindermen; it is of no advantage to the widow;
and there is much to be said for the view that the estate duty
should be payable, if this were administratively possible, upon the
death of the second spouse, and not upon the death of the first.
The problem of the imposition of estate duty upon a termination
of a life estate is one upon which many views can be taken. It is
possible to argue that as the life tenant is now dead, his interest is
worth nothing in his estate, and that no estate duty should be pay-
able. It could also be argued, if it were desired to impose some es-
tate duty upon it, that there should be added to the life tenant's es-
tate some value which relates to the actuarial value of the life es-
tate when he received it, or to the number of years during which he
has in fact enjoyed it. The English legislation, however, as has
been seen, takes a most extreme view; and this is explicable on his-
torical grounds.
In the 19th century when estate duty first came into operation,
much of the private capital in England was the subject of family set-
tlements. Many of these were settlements of land and included suc-
cessive life estates and estates tail. One of the objectives of these old
settlements was to prevent any person from becoming absolute
owner, for he then might be tempted to alienate the hereditary
family land or his creditors might proceed against it. The technique
of the English family land settlement was one whereby the fee was
divided, often in a very complicated manner, among the various
members of the family whom it was intended to benefit. If estate
45. Earl Cowley v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs [1899] A.C. 198; F.A. 1969,
c. 32, § 36 (2).
46. F.A. 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 30, § 5(2); F. (1909-1910) A. 1910, 10
Edw. 7, c. 8, § 55; F.A. 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 10, § 14; F.A. 1954, 2 & 3
Eliz. 2, c. 44, § 32, amended by, F.A. 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 54, § 36; F.A.
1969, c. 32, sched. 17, part II, para. b.
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duty legislation were to "bite" at all, it was necessarily directed to
these large settlements of private capital, and to the limited in-
terests which they contained. It is not surprising therefore, that
limited interests were made subject to duty (originally to "settle-
ment estate duty") and, since 1914, to estate duty. Where estate
duty is payable upon the death of a person holding such a limited in-
terest, the duty is payable by the trustees of the trust and not by
the executors of the deceased.47 Where therefore a person dies hav-
ing property of his own and a limited interest in a trust, the execu-
tors are accountable for the estate duty payable out of the free es-
tate, and the trustees for that due upon the trust fund.
5. Aggregation. Subject to exceptions 48 all property passing on
the death is aggregated. Thus, in order to ascertain the rate of
duty which is payable upon the free estate, it is necessary to make
a valuation of that and add to it the capital value of all the property
passing under the trusts in which the deceased has a limited inter-
est. Duty is then payable upon all these funds at the rate appli-
cable to the total aggregated value of the dutiable funds. For ex-
ample, if a man dies with: (1) an estate worth £ 75,000, (2) a life
interest in a marriage settlement of £ 75,000 and (3) a life interest
in a trust made by his parents for £ 75,000, duty payable on his death
would be that applicable to the aggregate sum of £ 225,000. The
duty payable would be £ 131,500. If the value of these component
parts of the aggregation had been greater, the amount payable
would, of course, be higher, and it may well be that it would be
higher than the actual value of the deceased's combined interests.
In the example given, if he became entitled to the life interests late
in life, these interests, valued actuarily, will be less than £ 25,000
each, so that the two life interests plus his own £ 75,000 will be
worth less than the £ 131,500 which is chargeable upon the various
funds at the death.
49
6. Charities. The only difference between gifts to charities and
47. F.A. 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 30, § 9(1).
48. Where, for example, the deceased's own (unsettled) property does
not exceed £ 10,000 in value, and the settled property in which the deceased
has a limited interest was not settled by him. Such a "small estate" forms
an estate by itself for estate duty purposes. F.A. 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 30,
§ 4 proviso; F.A. 1968, c. 44, § 35; F.A. 1969, c. 32, sched. 21, part V.
49. HANBURY, supra note 1 at 184-5.
gifts to other persons is that the "claw-back" period is one year.50
That is to say that if an inter vivos gift is made to charity and the
donor survives one year, the property is free of estate duty in the
hands of the charity. The equivalent period in the case of other
gifts, it will be remembered, is 7 years. There is no reduction,
however, in the estate duty liability where a testator gives property
by his will to charity, nor is there any capital gains tax relief in
respect of gifts to charity, nor is there any relief in respect of income
tax in the case of inter vivos gifts to charity. However, a covenant
to make a gift to charity for a period not less than seven years or
for life is treated as the income of the charity, and free of tax in
their hands, and the charity is able to recover from the Revenue the
income tax which had been paid by the donor. This, of course, is a
benefit to the charity and not to the donor.
It is hardly necessary to emphasize the tremendous significance
which estate duty plays in English estate planning or to underline
the great importance of estate planning to holders of private capi-
tal in England.
III. VARIATION OF TRUSTS
It is not surprising that beneficiaries under trusts in England have
sought to change the terms of the trusts in such a way as to escape
from the fiscal consequences of a succession of limited interests.
Where all the beneficiaries are adult and not under any disability,
there is no real difficulty. They may terminate the trust, if they
wish, or may agree among themselves upon an alteration or varia-
tion of the terms. This can be done without application to the
court.5 1
Where, however, there are infants who have interests in the trust
and who are unable at law to make decisions on their own, the trust
cannot be varied without the approval of the court. Until 1958 the
English courts had held that they had no power to approve the
variation of the beneficial interests under a trust where the object
of the variation was to save estate duty.52 The courts could approve
a compromise in a case in which there was a genuine dispute, 3
and there were many occasions on which considerable ingenuity was
used to find a dispute which the courts would consider sufficient to
justify its approval of a variation; and of course the variation, when
50. F. (1909-1910) A. 1910, 10 Edw. 7, c. 8, § 59(3), as amended, F.A.
1969, c. 32, sched. 17, part III, para. 6 (b).
51. HANBUY, ch. 21. See Marshall, 17 M.L.R. 420 (1954).
52. Chapman v. Chapman [1954] A.C. 429.
53. Re Downshire Settled Estates [1953] Ch. 218 (1952).
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it came, not only settled the dispute which was to be compromised,
but also rearranged the trust in such a way as to reduce estate duty
liability. Without the dispute, however, the courts felt that they
were in an impossible position if they were required by the terms of
a Finance Act to hold that estate duty was payable under certain
circumstances, and then were asked by the parties to approve the
variations of the trust so as to make the statutes inapplicable.54 In
1958, however, the Variation of Trusts Act was passed which spe-
cifically gave the court power to approve "any arrangement ...
varying or revoking all or any of the trusts, or enlarging the pow-
ers of the trustees of managing or administering any of the property
subject to the trusts."5 This jurisdiction has been widely exercised
and in most cases the exercise has been for the purpose of reducing
estate duty liability.5 6 Indeed, the statute may seem to be a strange
piece of legislation and it has in fact deprived the Revenue of many
millions of pounds in estate duty over the last 13 years. The justi-
fication for it is that it attempts to put infants in as favourable a
situation as adults. Otherwise, the courts would be saying, para-
doxically, that, in pursuance of their duty to protect the interests
of an infant, they are unable to approve on his behalf something
which is obviously for his benefit and which he could approve for
himself if he were an adult.
57
Much of the chancery practice in England at the present time is
in relation to the variation of such trusts. The legal adviser must
consider in great detail every person who might possibly have an
interest under the trust in any possible circumstances; in many cases
these will be infants or unborn persons, and under the Act an ap-
plication can be made to the court for a variation to be approved
on their behalf. The new trusts on which the property is to be
held are specially designed so as to escape the estate duty liabilities
which would otherwise have attached. There is not sufficient space
here to examine the ways in which the courts have exercised this
jurisdiction; it is sufficient to say that the approval of a variation
for the purpose of saving estate duty is now almost a routine event.
54. Lord Morton of Hemyton in Chapman v. Chapman [1954] A.C. 429, at
468 stating ". . . a most undignified game of chess between the Chancery
Division and the legislature."
55. Variation of Trusts Act 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 52, § 1 (1).
56. The cases are reviewed in 33 Cony. (n.s.) 113 (1969).
57. The Act was based on the Law Revision Committee's sixth report.
IV. ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES
In considering how to deal with his property, the trustor wishes
to arrange his affairs in such a way that the minimum liability to
estate duty, capital gains tax, income tax and surtax is suffered. He
has to consider tax and estate duty liability in his own lifetime and
on his death, and also the liability which will exist in respect of the
lives and deaths of the beneficiaries. This section will contain an
outline of some of the methods which have been used. It can be no
more than an outline, and further detailed examination will be nec-
essary to enable any tax planning decisions to be made. Where pos-
sible, references to sources of further information are given. It will
be clear to the reader how effective recent legislation has been in
blocking up a number of opportunities which have until the last
few years been available to tax planners.
To avoid estate duty liability, an owner of property must dispose
of it at least seven years before his death, and the donee must as-
sume possession and enjoyment of the property comprised in the
gift to the entire exclusion of the donor, or of any benefit to him by
contract or otherwise.58 The "claw-back" period is one which has
grown gradually over the years, beginning in 1881 with a period of
three months,59 and being extended at various times, reaching seven
years under the Finance Act 1968.60 There is however, as has been
pointed out, a reduction in the dutiable value of the property given
where the death occurred in the fifth, sixth and seventh years fol-
lowing the gift.
61
Income tax and surtax can be avoided by giving away the prop-
erty which earns the income, and income tax can be avoided by
covenanting to pay the income to another (who is liable at less than
the standard rate) for a period of seven years or more or for life.
The problems raised by legislation which already aggregates certain
income of infants with that of their parents has been explained.02
No surtax is payable under a trust in which the income is accumu-
lated under an express power to do so, for no beneficiary can make
any claim to income not allocated to him. The only tax payable is
income tax at the standard rate in accordance with the rule appli-
cable to all trust income.
With this general background, it is now appropriate to look at
58. F.A. 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 30, § 2(1) (c) incorporating the Customs
and Inland Revenue Act of 1881, 44 Vict., c. 12, § 38(2); F.A. 1968, c. 44,
§ 35.
59. Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1881, 44 Vict., c. 12, § 38.
60. F.A. 1968, c. 44, § 35.
6L F.A. 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 44, § 64; F.A. 1969, c. 44, § 35(2).
62. Supra note 12.
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some of the methods used for tax planning purposes. As indicated,
this is in many ways a disappointing list. It would have looked
much more promising a few years ago.
A. Absolute Gifts. An absolute gift of property to children,
grandchildren or other persons is the simplest form of an estate
duty saving. It must be given away seven years before the donor
dies. The income from the property disposed of will, if the donees
are infants and unmarried, be aggregated with that of their par-
ents.0 3 Otherwise it is for all purposes the property of the donee:
Capital gains tax will be payable upon the disposal. Such a form of
estate duty saving is only satisfactory, however, if the donee can
be trusted properly to look after a sum of capital and trusted, per-
haps, to dispose of it himself seven years prior to his own death.
Once given away, there is of course no way of controlling the man-
ner in which the donee spends it, wastes it, invests it or otherwise
deals with it.
A life tenant may similarly effect estate duty savings to the bene-
fit of the remaindermen. If nothing is done, duty will be payable
at the life tenant's death upon the whole capital of the trust, and at
a rate applicable to the aggregated value of the capital of the trust
plus the life tenant's free estate plus any other trusts in which the
life tenant has a limited interest. A surrender of the life interest
will free the trust of estate duty liability upon the life tenant's death
provided he survives the extinguishment of his interest by seven
years. No capital gains tax is payable, as this is a disposal, not of
an asset, but of an interest under a trust.0 4 If the life tenant needs
some capital from the fund, he may come to an arrangement with
the remaindermen, all being adult and under no disability, whereby
a proportion of the capital is transferred to the life tenant and the
balance to the remaindermen. Again, to avoid estate duty liability,
the life tenant must survive seven years. If, as will usually be the
case, some remaindermen are infant or unborn, an application must
be made to the court under the Variation of Trusts Act 1958 for the
approval of such an arrangement.0 5
B. Children's Trusts. Where the intended beneficiaries are in-
fants, it is common to create a trust which gives them interests con-
63. This rule will be amended as from April, 1972. F.A. 1971, § 16.
64. F.A. 1965, c. 25, sched. 7, para. 13 (1).
65. Supra note 55.
tingent upon attaining a certain age: sometimes majority (18),
sometimes 21, and sometimes a greater age. On reaching that age,
the beneficiary becomes absolutely entitled to claim his share of
the capital, and capital gains tax is payable at that time.A0 And
the question again is raised whether it is desirable to provide blocks
of capital to be available in the future for infant beneficiaries whose
capability to deal wisely with such a windfall cannot yet be judged.
During the lifetime of such a trust, the situation, subject to pro-
vision to the contrary in the trust instrument, is governed by
Trustee Act 1925, section 31. This gives to the trustees a statutory
power to apply the income of the trust for the maintenance, educa-
tion or benefit of infant beneficiaries. On attaining majority, the
beneficiary, again subject to contrary provision in the trust in-
strument,67 is entitled to his share of the income. During minority,
surplus income is to be accumulated, and paid over to the benefi-
ciary on his becoming absolutely entitled. The trustees also s
have power to advance up to one half of the beneficiary's presump-
tive share of the capital, even though the beneficiary may only be
contingently entitled.
Such a settlement provides a number of advantages. The income,
if paid to or for the benefit of the infant beneficiaries, counts as
their income. This has tax advantages, subject to the aggregation
of income provisions, previously explained. If the income is ac-
cumulated instead of being paid out or applied, the income is taxed
at the standard rate of income tax only, in accordance with the
usual rule for trust income. Estate duty is payable upon the death
of the beneficiaries whose interests have vested, but not in respect
of the death of those entitled contingently, even if some of the in-
come has been applied for their maintenance.09
The power of advancement given by Trustee Act 1925, section 32
may also have tax planning advantages in a way similar to the
surrender of a life interest. If the trust contains successive in-
terests in favour of a life tenant and remainderman, an advance-
ment of part of the capital of the fund in favour of the remainder-
man reduces the value of the fund, and hence the estate duty lia-
bility upon the death of the life tenant. The beneficiaries become
entitled earlier than they otherwise would, and, subject to the usual
seven year "claw-back" rule, will become entitled to a larger (es-
66. F.A. 1965, c. 25, § 25 (3).
67. Re Turner's Will Trust [1937] Ch. 15 (1936); Re McGeorge [1963]
Ch. 544.
68. Trustee Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19, § 32.
69. A-G v. Power [1900] I. R. 272.
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tate-duty-free) sum. It was held in Pilkington v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners7° that this was a proper exercise of the power of ad-
vancement in that it was for the "benefit" of the advanced bene-
ficiary, even though she was in that case a two-year old girl who
was supplied with all the material comforts she could desire. Nor
was it an objection that a child so young could not handle the
money, for the House of Lords held that, in making the advance-
ment, the trustees could settle the capital upon new trusts provided
that this was for the benefit of the beneficiary.
C. Discretionary Trusts. The discretionary trust developed in
England as the main method of avoiding liability to estate duty
upon the death of beneficiaries under a trust. As has been seen,
where a beneficiary dies who has a limited interest under a trust,
the whole subject-matter of the trust passes and estate duty is
payable thereon. If, however, the beneficiary had no property in-
terest, then no property would pass on his death. This has
been the basis of the success of discretionary trusts over the years,
but, as will be seen, their usefulness for this purpose has been very
much restricted by the Finance Act 1969.
Where property is given to trustees upon trust to apply the in-
come and capital at their absolute discretion among one or more
members of a class of beneficiaries, it has been held that no one
beneficiary has an interest in the property,71 except in any
property which the trustees see fit to give him in the exer-
cise of their discretion. Such property would be in his free estate
anyway. That apart, no property passes on his death and the
capital of the trust is not therefore affected. The trustees must
be free to exercise their own discretion and not be restricted or
hampered in any way, but the trustor can of course make sugges-
tions to the trustees, and it is common indeed for a document to be
given to the trustees indicating the ways in which the trustor
would like to have the income distributed and capital payments
made, making clear of course that the document does not in any
way restrict the free discretion which has been given to the trust-
tees. None of the beneficiaries has any interest beyond that of re-
quiring the trustee to consider the exercise of the discretion in his
favour. This is not a property interest and therefore on his death,
70. [1964] A.C. 612 (1962).
71. Gartside v. Inland Revenue Conm'rs [1968] A.C. 553, 580 (1967).
no duty was payable upon the capital of the trust. Of course, it
may well be, and indeed it is likely that, the trustees will make
payments of the income and capital just as the trustor would wish,
nd just as the trustor would have provided if he had given specific
fixed interests to the beneficiaries.
The operation of a discretionary trust can be made clear by tak-
ing an example of a family man making a will or making an inter
vivos trust. He wishes first of all to benefit his widow and his
children and, perhaps, other persons as well. If he were creating
fixed trusts, he would give a life interest to the widow; he might
then divide up the property and give life interests to each of the
children with remainders over to his grandchildren. Duty would
then be payable upon the death of all the persons concerned, un-
less the trustor died within seven years of the making of the trust
and duty was paid on his death in respect of the property, in which
case the second spouse exemption would cover the widow's death.
The trustor's intentions could be met, and prior to 1969 could be
effected without any liability to estate duty at any stage, provided
the discretionary trust was created at least seven years before the
death. The class of the beneficiaries would be the widow, the chil-
dren, the grandchildren, and anyone else whom the trustor wished
to include, and the trustees could, of course, pay all the income to
the widow during her life and then the income in shares to the chil-
dren during their lives and the capital over to the grandchildren
after that. By effecting this means of a discretionary trust, rather
than by a fixed trust, it has been possible for many years to avoid
the liability to estate duty on the death of any of the beneficiaries.
Various points must be remembered in creating discretionary
trusts. Firstly, it is extremely important to appoint co-operative
trustees. If they have a disagreement with the trustor, then all the
power is in them, and there is absolutely nothing the trustor can do
about it. Secondly, there are questions relating to the class of bene-
ficiaries. It is important not to have the class too large because that
could be held void for uncertainty.72 On the other hand, it is im-
portant not to have the class too small because if it were reduced
to a single person, then that person would be entitled to the income
72. The difficulties have been much reduced by the relaxation of the
existing rules in McPhail v. Doulton [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1110. Previously, a
trust would be held void for uncertainty, unless it was possible to list all
the beneficiaries. See Inland Revenue Comm'rs. v. Broadway Cottages
Trust [1955] Ch. 20. The rule for certainty of trusts is now the same as
that established in Re Gulbenkian's Settlements [1970] A.C. 508, for pow-
ers, namely that it is valid if it can be said with certainty whether any
given individual is or is not a member of the class. See HANBURY at 125
and supplement.
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and there would be a passing of property on the death of that per-
son.73 The duration of the trust is also important, since each time
the trustees exercise a discretion, it creates a new property interest
in the person to whom the property is given, and such an exercise
would be invalid if it were exercised outside the perpetuity period.74
It is essential, therefore, that the trust be limited to the perpetuity
period. Such a trust would normally start with a statement that it
was to terminate at a certain time in the future, and specific prop-
erty interests are given to persons at that time. In England the tra-
ditional practice has been to select, as measuring lives, certain mem-
bers of the Royal Family under what we call a Royal Lives Clause,
and the period ends 21 years after the death of the survivor. It is
possible now, however, to choose a specific period of a number of
years, not exceeding 80, as the perpetuity period under Section 1 of
the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964.
It is common also to include other powers in the trustees, of which
two should be mentioned. Firstly, the power of accumulation
which enables the trustees to accumulate for a permitted period
of time any income which the trustees do not see fit to distribute to
the beneficiaries. 75 Secondly, a power in the trustees to terminate
the trust and to appoint the property upon new trusts which is of
importance in order to avoid the possibility of fixed interests arising
at the end of the period covered by the trust and also to enable the
trustees to take advantage of opportunities which arise in the con-
text of alterations to the estate duty or income tax law in the fu-
ture.
Summarizing this, it has been possible for many years (though
the moment of doom has now arrived) to put the family capital into
a discretionary trust which will last for 80 years,' or for lives in
being plus 21 years in which the trustees have a complete freedom
to distribute the income and capital among the beneficiaries-pre-
sumably doing this in exactly the same way that the trustor would
wish them to-without paying estate duty at any stage during the
73. Re Weirs, Settlement Trusts [1970] 3 W.L.R. 860.
74. Re Coleman [1936] Ch. 528 (1935).
75. For the periods of accumulation permitted by English law, see Law
of Property Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, §§ 164-166; Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55, §§ 13-14; R. MauDsLEY AND BURN, LAD-
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 244-50 (2d ed. 1970). The usual period to
use for this purpose is a period of 21 years from the creation of the trust.
currency of the trust. Such an easy way round the estate duty lia-
bility has made it possible to bear with less complaint the severity of
the estate duty rate. Estate duty was commonly called a "volun-
tary tax," and, of course, it was the very rich who most needed to
avoid it and who could be sure to be provided with the best legal ad-
vice to enable them to do so. It was surprising indeed that discre-
tionary trusts were permitted for as long as they were. A very seri-
ous attack was made upon discretionary trusts by the Finance
Act of 1969. This act provided that where there was a discretionary
trust, estate duty will be payable upon the capital of the fund on the
death of any beneficiary who had received any income; the propor-
tion of the fund liable being that proportion of the income which the
beneficiary had received during a certain prior period which, for
simplicity's sake, I will call seven years.76 Thus, if under a dis-
cretionary trust the income is paid to one individual, and that in-
dividual dies, duty is payable upon the capital of the trust in the
same manner in which it would have been if that person had had a
fixed interest. Where it is shared among a number of persons, then
it is necessary to see what percentage of the income these persons
had, and duty is payable upon the capital of the trust upon their
death in the same proportion. In short, this is a way in which es-
tate duty liability is imposed upon discretionary trusts by treating
them as if the income benefits which the beneficiaries receive had
been received by them under a strict entitlement instead of at the
discretion of the trustees.
It is not clear what answers the estate planners will find to all
this. The legislation has been in force for something over two years.
Different people have different views on the way in which the mat-
ter shall be handled, and it is not yet clear what settled practice
will develop. A few points, however, can be made.
1. Some have taken the view that discretionary trusts should now
be terminated and no new ones created. That seems to me to be
quite wrong. However disappointed one may be about the loss of
the estate duty privileges which discretionary trusts had, they are
at least in no worse position than fixed trusts, and the adaptability
of such a trust enables the trustees to exercise their discretion in
such a way as to take advantage of future changes in the law. Dis-
cretionary trusts have advantages independent of estate duty sav-
ing.
2. The trustees can maneuver the payment of income in such a
way as to reduce estate duty liability to the minimum, and to
76. F.A. 1969, c. 32, §§ 36(2), 37(3). See also, Nsw L.J., July 31, 1969.
(A.D. Lawton).
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pay to the young, rather than to the old. For example, if there is
one member of the class who has no capital at all and the other
members are sufficiently well off, it will be advantageous from the
income tax and the estate duty point of view to pay all the income
to the impecunious member; on the death of that member duty
will be payable on the capital of the fund, but, of course, it will not
be aggregated with any other property because the beneficiary had
none. The other members of the class could receive, instead, pay-
ments of capital. So long as all the income has been disposed of
this would not give rise to the imposition of estate duty upon the
capital of the fund on their death for this liability depends upon re-
ceipt of income from the fund.
3. It is possible to argue that the best way to handle the matter is
to avoid any income being earned by the fund. This is perfectly
satisfactory so long as it is possible to be sure that is so. The
danger is that the fund may earn something that is income, or is
treated as income, and if that receipt is paid to any member, per-
haps without foreseeing the consequences, then estate duty may be
payable on the whole of the fund on that beneficiary's death.
4. Provided the beneficiaries die in the right order, it is possible
to maneuver the matter in such a way that full advantage is taken
of the income without estate duty becoming payable. Assume that
a grandfather creates a discretionary trust in favour of his children
and grandchildren. The trustees could pay the income to the chil-
dren during the period in which their families are growing up. A
stage is reached at which those children (that is, now the parents)
no longer have parental financial responsibilities and may have
money of their own, and their children (the grandchildren) are
bringing up their own families and in need of the income. If the in-
come is paid to the children for a period of seven years, then no es-
tate duty will be payable on the death of their parents who have
not received any income during the previous seven years. Pay-
ments of capital can safely be made to the parents, provided that all
the income has been paid out elsewhere.
5. It has also been suggested that with well-to-do people the trus-
tees should be given power to pay the income to charity if they
should see fit. The fund could then be invested in growth stocks
yielding a small income, the whole of the income could be paid to
charity, and capital distributions could be made to the benefi-
ciaries. The amount of income lost in this way to the family would,
of course, be trivial in comparison with the estate duty which would
be saved on their death, and if there is sufficient money, it may be
desirable to have a proportion of it paid to charity in any case.
D. Marriage Settlements. It has been customary for centuries in
England among well-to-do families to use the marriage of a child as
the occasion to pass on a proportion of the family capital to the
younger generation. In modern times, it has become more common
to pass on a block of capital by absolute gift at any suitable time, or
to make a discretionary settlement during the infancy of the chil-
dren. Until 1963, a marriage was a suitable occasion for tax plan-
ning purposes to make a provision, whether by way of outright
gift or by way of family settlement; for gifts, made in consideration
of marriage-of any size and by whomsoever made-were free of
estate duty on the death of the donor even if he died on the follow-
ing day. Restrictions were imposed in 1963,77 and the position is
now governed by the Finance Act 1968, section 36.
This section imposes an upper limit for the estate duty advan-
tages of X 5,000 in the case of gifts by a parent or by a more remote
ancestor or by a party to the marriage, and a limit of £ 1,000 in the
case of gifts made by other people. The gifts must be made "in con-
sideration of marriage," that is to say, "made before the particular
marriage and in contemplation of it; or immediately after and in
consideration of it [this in practice means the day of the wedding];
or at any time after the marriage but in pursuance of an agreement
made prior to it. ' 7 8 There is no exemption from capital gains tax in
respect of such a gift.
E. Life Insurance Policies. Policies of life insurance can use-
fully be employed for tax planning purposes, but, as may be ex-
pected, less effectively now than was possible a few years ago.
They have advantages from the point of view of income tax and es-
tate duty.
Firstly, income tax: Generally, the payment of premiums upon a
policy of life insurance, whether or not it provides other benefits
as well, and whether or not it has been assigned or charged or made
subject to a trust, entitles the assured to relief from income tax
(but not from surtax) in respect of 2/5 of the premiums.79
It was at one time profitable for tax payers in the higher tax
brackets to pay only the first premium upon a life policy, and to
77. F.A. 1963, c. 25, § 53(1).
78. PoT AND MONROE, TAX PLANNING 198 (4th ed. 1970).
79. Full details are given in T.A. 1970, c. 2, §§ 19-21.
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borrow money on the security of the policy for the payment of
further premiums. This practice has effectively been ended by the
withdrawal of tax advantages,80 and by further restrictions upon
tax relief upon borrowed money generally.8 1
Secondly, estate duty: It should be remembered that in England,
a third party has no right to sue upon a contract of which he is in-
tended to be the beneficiary. Thus, if A contracts with B Insurance
Co., and the contract provides that the policy monies shall be
paid to C, C has no legal right to sue for the money. To give en-
forceable rights to C, C can be made the beneficiary under a trust,
either by express declaration of trust, or by taking advantage of
the Married Women's Property Act 1882,82 or the policy could be
assigned to C.
If a policy of life insurance is taken out by the deceased for his
own benefit, it forms part of the assets in the estate of the deceased,
like any other property. If a policy is given away, after being fully
paid up, it is a gift of property which will attract estate duty lia-
bility,8 3 unless the donor survives the gift by seven years. The
usual case, however, is a gift of a policy which is not fully paid up,
or a gift of premiums payable upon such a policy.
Here duty will be payable in the case of death within seven years
in respect (a) of the value accorded to the policy at the date of the
gift;8 4 and also (b) if the donor continues to pay the premiums for
the benefit of the donee, in respect of the gift of the premiums.83
The valuation is worked out according to the provisions of Finance
Act 1959, section 34, and is based upon the proportion in (a) which
the premiums paid at the date of the gift bear to the aggregate
80. T.A. 1970, c. 2, §§ 403, 405.
81. See T.A. 1970, c. 2, §§ 57-64.
82. The relevant part of the section states: "A policy of assurance af-
fected by any man on his own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of
his wife, or of his children, or of his wife and children, or any of them, or
by any woman on her own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of her
husband, or of her children, or of her husband and children, or any of
them, shall create a trust in favour of the objects therein named, and the
moneys payable under such policy shall not, so long as any object of the
trust remains unperformed, form part of the estate of the insured, or be
subject to his or her debts .. " Married Women's Property Act 1882,
45 & 46 Vict., c. 75, § 11.
83. F.A. 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 30, § 2(1) (c).
84. F.A. 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 58, § 34(3).
85. F.A. 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, 58, § 34(2).
amount of premiums payable up to the maturity of the policy, and
in (b) which the premiums paid by the donor in the seven years be-
fore his death bear to the aggregate amount of premiums paid at
the maturity of the policy. There will thus be no liability in respect
of premiums if the premiums are paid by the donee, and this will
still be so even if they are paid with money given by the donor if it
is possible to bring the case within the exception applicable to gifts
which are part of the normal expenditure out of income by the
deceased."6
Duty will therefore be payable in respect of a life insurance policy
if it was owned by the deceased and given away within the last
seven years, or if the donor has paid the premiums within the last
seven years. A policy on the life of the deceased which was held in
trust for a beneficiary, and whose premiums were not paid by the
deceased is not liable to duty. In the usual case, however, where
the deceased has intended to benefit the donee, it was possible be-
fore 1968, but no longer, to take advantage of special rules which
related to aggregation. Property which passed on the death "in
which the deceased never had an interest shall not be aggregated
with other property, but shall be an estate by itself .... "87 This
requirement could be met by providing for the policy to be subject
to a trust for the donee at the moment of its inception, so that the
donor never had any interest in it. A policy taken out under section
11 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 would qualify. It
was therefore profitable for a man with a large estate to take out
life insurance policies of this type. If he paid the premiums, they
would be subject to duty under Finance Act 1969, section 34, as ex-
plained above,88 but duty would be payable at the rate applicable
to the amount calculated under the formula of section 34, regard-
less of the value of the remainder of the estate. Similarly, the re-
mainder of the estate would not be affected by the size of the life
insurance policy.
Freedom from aggregation, however, ended in 1968. Finance Act
1968, section 38 (1) provided that, for the purposes of aggregation,
any property which under section 2(1) (c) passes on the death shall
be property in which the deceased had an interest. Some limited
exceptions were allowed under subsections (7)-(13) which relate
only to policies issued in respect of policies of insurance made be-
fore March 20, 1968. This situation was continued in Finance Act
1969, which repealed the basic provisions relating to nonaggrega-
86. F.A. 1968, c. 44, § 37.
87. F.A. 1894, 57 & 58 Vie., c. 30, § 4 proviso, as amended, F.A. 1900,
63 Vict., c. 1, § 12(1) and F.A. 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 28, § 40(2).
88. Supra at note 84.
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tion,89 but not so as to affect the limited exceptions allowed by Fi-
nance Act 1968, section 38.
F. Voluntary Seven-Year Covenants. It has been possible for
many years to provide tax-saving benefits for another without set-
ting up any trust or disposing of any capital. Money paid in pur-
suance of a covenant to pay an annual sum to another for a period
of seven years or more or for life is treated as the income of the
donee. If, therefore, as will be the usual case, the money paid un-
der the covenant was money which had already borne tax, the tax
may be reclaimed. If the donee is not liable to pay tax-perhaps
because it is a charity-or is liable only to pay at a lower rate, as
will usually be the case with a payment to a child-a saving is ef-
fected. In practice the method of dealing with the matter has been
to arrange for the donor to pay "such sum as after deduction of in-
come tax for the time being payable in respect thereof will leave
S.. the clear yearly sum of £x."90 Therefore, instead of paying to
the donee £ 100 and recovering the tax himself, the donor pays
£ 61.25 (out of £ 100 of income from which tax at the rate of 38.75%
has been deducted) and the donee recovers the tax from the Rev-
enue. A covenant entered into before April 7, 1965 would save in-
come tax, and in some cases, including covenants in favour of
named individuals and in favour of charity, surtax too. Covenants
entered into after that date save income tax only, and not surtax.91
This technique was and still is in common use as a method of
making income tax-free gifts to charity. It will be remembered that
the British tax system gives no tax allowance in respect of other
gifts to charity. The technique was widely used also until 1969 as
a means by which senior (and richer) members of a family could
make financial provision for the children. There has been no ad-
vantage since 1936 in a parent doing this for his own children; for,
as explained above, the income would be aggregated with that of the
parent.9 2 Such aggregation applied until 1969 only to the case of
parent and child. Grandparents, uncles and other relations exe-
cuted such covenants in large numbers. The Finance Act 1968, sec-
tion 15, however, as explained above, provided that as from April
89. The proviso in F.A. 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 30, § 4 was repealed by
F.A. 1969, c. 32, sched. 21, part V.
90. POTTER & MONROE, TAX PLANNinG 41 (4th ed. 1970).
91. There are exceptions in T.A. 1970, c. 2, § 457.
92. Supra note 63.
1969 aggregation should apply to all income of infant unmarried
children not regularly working. The fiscal advantages of a seven-
year covenant then disappeared unless the income of the donee and
that of his parent were together insufficient to attract the stand-
ard rate of income tax. Aggregation of children's income with that
of their parents, other than that provided by parents for their own
infant children, will end in 1972; and it is likely that the technique
of the seven-year covenant will have a new lease on life-at least
until the next election.
3
G. Particular Types of Property: Timber, Agricultural Land,
Industrial Hereditaments; Objects of National, Scientific, Histori-
cal or Artistic Interest.
For various reasons, certain types of property have received spe-
cial treatment in respect of estate duty liability. Tax planners
have been quick to take advantage of them. As with so many of the
situations previously discussed, the estate duty advantages of the
favorite of these--objects of national interest, etc.-have been much
curtailed. The one which currently gives the greatest advantages
is the ownership of timber and woodlands, but not every property
owner wishes to select such an investment for the bulk of his es-
tate.
1. Timber. Where an estate comprises land on which timber,
trees, woods or underwood are growing, the value of such timber,
etc. is not to be taken into account in calculating the value of the
estate. Nor is duty payable upon the timber until it is sold. Duty
is then payable in respect of the proceeds or value of the timber at
the rate applicable to the rest of the estate in which the timber
last passed on a death. 4
Such a situation creates many tax planning opportunities. The
whole of an estate may be invested in timber, so that the estate rate
is nil. Or the estate of an elderly person may be charged with a
loan (reducing the value of the estate), which is used to purchase
timber. And the sale of the timber may be timed so as to take
place subsequent to the death of an owner with a low rate of es-
tate duty applicable to his estate. These provisions are unaffected
by recent legislation.
2. Agricultural Property95 and Industrial Hereditaments Used
93. POTTER AND MONROE, TAX PLANING, ch. 1 (4th ed. 1970).
94. F. (1909-1910) A. 1910, 10 Edw. 7, c. 8, § 61(5); F.A. 1912, 2 & 3
Geo. 5, c. 8, § 9.
95. F.A. 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 23(1), as amended, F.A. 1949,
12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 47, § 28(1).
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for the Purpose of a Business.96 These are charged only at the rate
of 55% of the normal estate rate.
3. Objects of National, Scientific, Historical or Artistic Interest.
Until 1969, the situation relating to such objects was similar to that
affecting timber. The Finance Act 1969, section 39, has, however,
greatly reduced the attractions of this type of property for tax plan-
ning purposes.
The objects which are here included are "such pictures, prints,
books, manuscripts, works of art, scientific collections, or other
things not yielding income as on a claim being made by the Treas-
ury ... appear to them to be of national, scientific, historic or ar-
tistic interest. '97 They are exempt from duty so long as they are
retained,98 but since 1950 it has been necessary to give to the Treas-
ury an undertaking to the effect that the object will be kept per-
manently in the United Kingdom, that reasonable steps will be
taken for their protection and that the Treasury will be given rea-
sonable opportunities for examination for the purpose of seeing
these steps taken for their preservation or for the purposes of re-
search.99
As stated above, no estate duty is payable if the objects are re-
tained and the undertaking is complied with, nor is duty payable if
a sale is made to the National Gallery, the British Museum, or any
other similar national institution, any university, county council or
municipal corporation in Great Britain, or the National Art Collec-
tion Fund.10 0 Otherwise, in the case of sale or material breach of
the undertaking, the estate duty position depends on whether the
sale or material breach took place within three years of the death, or
whether subsequently. If the object is sold or the breach occurred
within three years of the death, it is included in the estate for all
purposes. The valuation is as of the date of death, and this sum is
aggregated with the estate, and estat4 duty is payable upon both at
the rate applicable to that aggregate sum. Any capital gains tax
which may arise upon a sale within three years of the death is not
96. F.A. 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 44, § 28.
97. F.A. 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 28, § 40 (3).
98. F.A. 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 28, § 40(1).
99. F.A. 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 15, § 48.
100. F.A. 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 28, § 40(2) proviso. See also, F.A.
1931, 21 & 22 Geo. 5, c. 28, § 40 for an exemption in the case of land
given to the National Trust.
an allowable deduction against the object's value for the purpose of
estate duty.10 1
If the sale takes place outside the three year period, the object is
liable to duty at the rate applicable to the aggregate principal value
of the estate plus the object; but this does not have any effect upon
the estate duty liability of the estate itself. In valuing the object
for estate duty purposes, capital gains tax payable in respect of the
sale may in this case be deducted. The value is taken at the date
of disposal,102 and this may well, with continually inflated values,
be considerably higher than it was at the date of the death.
The distinction was explained in a Parliamentary statement by
a Government representative in the debate on the budget in 1969.
If a work of art is sold within three years, that work of art and the
rest of the estate is taken together and the appropriate estate rate
fixed. For example, if a man had a general estate worth £50,000
and works of art worth £100,000 and the works of art are sold
within three years, the appropriate estate rate on both the works
of art and on the general estate will be that appropriate to a total of
£150,000. If the works of art are sold more than three years after
death, they will be aggregated with the rest of the estate and will
bear duty at the rate of £150,000, but the original estate of £50,000
will be at the estate rate appropriate to £50,000.... Works of art
will remain an extremely attractive investment, provided that they
are kept for three years after death, because they will still be left
out of account in fixing the estate rate payable on the rest of the es-
tate.103
The withdrawal of so many of the estate duty advantages which
used to be available to private holders of such objects may well
lead to an increasing number of sales to public institutions.
Sales to these national institutions may now become more attrac-
tive; before F.A. 1969 a sale to someone other than such an insti-
tution, although assessable, did not lose the non-aggregation bene-
fit; but since F.A. 1969 a sale to someone other than an institution
will result in full aggregation. The national institutions will not
be slow to use such estate duty advantage as a bargaining factor
in reducing the price offered by them.104
V. SUimy
I have attempted to give only an outline of tax and estate duty
law in England, and of some of the techniques which have devel-
oped to reduce the burdens. For the sake of clarity and brevity,
I have omitted many of the details, and I hardly need to remind my
readers of the great dangers of relying upon incomplete statements
101. F.A. 1969, c. 32, § 39(2).
102. F.A. 1969, c. 32, § 39(2).
103. Quoted in Roy, PRAcTIcAL ESTATE DuTY PLANNING 109 (1970).
104. d. at 110.
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of law, especially in this field. My hope, however, is that a general
discussion of the subject may be of some interest for its own sake;
and secondly that it may give to those who operate in the interna-
tional trusts field, some idea of what is going on in Britain at the
present time. It would be too much to hope that this paper can
provide all the answers; but perhaps it may help those concerned
with this branch of the law, at least, to formulate some of the ques-
tions.105
105. This paper originated in talks given to meetings of the Trusts and
Probate Sections of the San Diego and La Jolla Bar Associations. I take
the opportunity to thank again my hosts on those occasions.
